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ONC-RANCE economic planning in the United
States began in calendar 1975 with the preparation of
the fiscal 1976 Federal budget.1 Since then, each
budget document has included economic assumptions
and budget projections for a five-year horizon.2 For
example, the fiscal 1978 budget, for which estimates
were first prepared in January 1977 and then revised
in July 1977, includes assumptions and projections
through 1982. The assumptions for the current year
and the next are called “forecasts,” hut beyond the
next year the assumptions are labeled as “projections
consistent with moving gradually toward relatively
stable prices and maximum feasible employment.”3 In
other words, for the longer run, the assumptions for
output growth, inflation, and unemployment can be
viewed as macroeconomic goals.
The Carter Administration’s national economic goals
for 1981 include:4
1.a reduction of unemployment to 4.75 percent of
the labor force from the current level of about
7 percent;
2. a reduction in the rate of inflation to a 4.3 percent
annual rate;
3. a balance in the Federal budget at expenditure and
revenue levels equal to 21 percent of GNP.
Although the Administration is explicit in its specifi-
cation of fiscal policy assumptions for the period 1977
through 1981, it says nothing about its monetary
IPresentation of the Administration’s long—run budget projec-
tions and economic assumptions is required under the provi—
sions of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974.
1For a sinnniaiy of the year—by—year economic assumptions
that have been made thus far, see Table I.
iThe short—term assumptions are presented as forecasts of
probable econnm~c conditions whereas the longer range as-
sumptions are “mechanical projections.” The diflerence is
that “forecasts” are best guesses as to likely outcomes, taking
into account all factors impinging on the economy (including
external shocks, e.g.. changes in oil prices). Long—run as-
sumptions (or projections) arc based On systematic and
predictable influences on economic activity, and thus do not
reflect an attempt to predict the occurrence of external
shocks or changes in economic structureS cc ‘The Budget of
the United States Government, Fiscal lear 1976 (Washing-
ton, l).C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975).
-iOffice of Management and Budget, Mid Session Review of
the Fiscal 1978 Budget (July 1, 1977).Also see Remarks by
Charles L. Scbultze, Chairman, Council of Economic Ad-
visers, to New York Financial Writers Association ( May 18,
1977). Although projections are presented through 1982, the
Administration focuses its discussion on 1981,
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policy assumptions. Furthermore, details about the
structure of its underlying economic model are not
made explicit.
A unique feature of the goals of the current Admin-
istration is the self-imposed constraint on the growth
of Federal spending and the goal of budget balance.
Budget goals had been set forth in general terms in
earlier budgets, but previous budgets did not specifi-
cally state a desire to achieve a balanced budget, nor
did they impose the additional constraint of limiting
the size of Federal spending to a stated percentage of
CNP. The emergence of this goal might he related to
the persistence of large Federal deficits in recent
years, and, in particular, the concern expressed by
the financial and business community about their
magnitude.
EVALUATION PROCEDURE
Although the Administration does not provide in-
formation about its underlying model, it is essential to
examine the long-range goals within the context of a
particular analytical framework. The question asked
here is whether the set of economic goals is consistent
with a monetarist model of the U.S. economy.5 The
model which is used is a modified form of the “St.
Louis model.”6 The chief modification is the use of a
newly developed potential output series.7
Since the Administration does not make its assump-
tions about monetary policy explicit, its goals are first
examined to determine their implications for monetary
growth. In a monetarist framework, such assumptions
are critical, and in the monetary model used here,
changes in money are the primary driving force.
The St. Louis model includes direct determination
of CNP, via a reduced form equation, relating the
5
For a similar analysis of the administration’s 1981 goals using
the Wharton model (University of Pennsylvania), see
Thomas F. Dernburg and L. Douglas Lee, “The Macro-
economic Goals of the Administration for 1981: Targets and
Realizatiuns,” A Stat/p Prepared for the Use of the Joint
Economic Committee (August 5, 1977). See insert.
“A detailed snmmary of these modifications is available upon
request. For a discussion of the original model see Leonall C.
Andersen and Keith M. Carlson, “A Monetarist Model for
Economic Stabilization,” this Review (April 1970), pp. 7-25.
Robert 11. Rasehe and John A. Tatom, “Energy Resources
and Potential CNP,” this Review (June 1977), pp. 10-24.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1977
Table I
SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION PROJECTIONS
T:me of
Projection 1975 19?6 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
GNP (Billions of Dollars)
January 1975 1514.6 17055 1917.0 2147.0 2378.9 2635.8
Jaruory 1976 1718.4 1928.0 2167.1 2425.0 2689.3 2934.0
Jarst.ory 1977 1 894 2 1108.3 2352 8 2599.9 2805.3 2984.8
July 1977 1699.3 21 25.4 2365.5 26163 2872.7 3119.7
Aelual 1528.8 1706.5
Peal GNP (Billions of 1972 Dollars)
Joiua,y 1975 11776 1234.1 1303.2 1388.0 14782 1574.3
January 1976 1276.6 1349.4 1429.0 1521.9 1620.8 1700.2
January 1977 1341 0 1409.4 14925 1574.6 1636.0 1693.3
July 1977 1339.7 1410.7 1481.3 1558.3 1634.6 1704.9
Actual 1202 I 1274.7
P’ice Deflator (1977 = 100)
Ja’iucry 1975 128.58 138.23 147.2] 154.72 161.06 1 67.51
Jant.ary 1976 134 64 142.99 151.71 15930 165.99 172.63
January 1977 141 36 14970 157.78 16520 171.47 176.27
July 1977 141 76 150.69 159.88 168.03 17526 182.62
Aclual 127.18 13388
Unnmplayment Rate (Percenl)
January 1975 8.1 7.9 7.5 6.9 6.2 55
January 1976 7.7 6.9 6.4 5.8 5.2 4.9
January 1977 7.3 6.6 57 4.9 4 8 4.7
Jumy 1977 7.0 6.3 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.5
Aclual 8.5 7.7
3-Month 1. easury Bill Rate (Percenll
Janua’y 1975 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.0 5.0 5.0
JanuaTy 1976 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.0
January 1977 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Ju’y 1977 4.9 5.0 50 5.0 5.0 5.0
Aclual 5.8 50
‘‘uI ‘;NP inrrt art :.J,’’’-LCTI I.- nrL.I 11,77 e’,si.Tis ni N[:~acr.u.mnts.
change in CNP to current and past changes in money
and high-employment Federal expenditures. Estimates
of the equation indicate that over a period of a year
or more, steady growth in Federal spending in the
absence of changes in the rate of monetary expansion
has little net effect on the growth rate of CNP. The
primary factor determining the growth of CNP over
a period of a year or more is the trend of money and
the trend of velocity as embodied in the estimated
constant term.8
5
These results regarding fiscal actions remain in dispute. See
Benjamin M. Friedman, “Even the St. Losmis Model Now
Believes in Fiscal Policy,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking (May 1977), pp. 365-67. Friedman’s results fol-
low from an updated estimation of the GNP equation in first
difference (arithmetic) form. The conclusion about the net
effect of fiscal actions being near zero continues to hold
when the equation is estimated in log first difference form.
Analysis of the two specifications indicates that the log first
difference form shows greater coefficient stability over time
than does the arithmetic first difference form.
The change in CNP is divided between price and
output change via a price equation. This price equa-
tion gives the change in prices as a function of current
demand pressure and the recent history of price
change. Over the long run, however, estimated price
change is dominated by the trend of money growth,
since the growth of total spending (driven by money)
is the chief determinant of demand pressure. Civen
the change in CNP and prices, output change is
found as a residual.
The final three equations of the model determine
the unemployment rate and long- and short-term in-
terest rates. Changes in output are used to estimate
the unemployment rate via Okun’s law.9
°Arthnr NI. Ok-un, “Potential GNP: Its Measurement and
Significance,” 1982 Proceedings of the Business and Eco-
nolnie Statistics Section of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, pp. 98-104, Okun’s Law relates the unemployment rate
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ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
1981 GOALS
For purposes of evaluating the Administration’s 1981
economic goals, the crucial assumption in the St.Louis
model is the growth of money. By examining the rela-
tions between money and CNP, money and prices,
and money and interest rates, the consistency of the
Administration’s goals can he checked. Furthermore,
the budget constraints can he examined to see if they
are simultaneously attainable. The reader is reminded
that these simulations of the St. Louis model do not
incorporate the effects of possible external shocks, and
thus should not be considered as forecasts. Such an
exercise is based on the assumption that average rela-
tionships of the past will hold in the future, and an
evaluation of the consistency of future goals is con-
ducted within that context.
Money and GNP
The Administration has set a goal for nominal GNP
of $2,873 billion for 1981 (see Table II). GNP would
have to grow at a 10.9 percent average annual rate
from 1977 to 1981. Given past relationships between
money and GNP, the money stock (Ml, that is, cur-
rency plus demand deposits) would have to grow at
about a 7.1 percent annual rate from current levels
(third quarter 1977) in order for such a GNP goal to
be realized (see Table III).
It is also informative to examine the year-by-year
path to this CNP goal in 1981. The Administration has
laid out a path whereby the growth of GNP is faster
in the earlier years then slows toward the end of the
planning period. These growth rates are shown in
Table IV. According to the St. Louis model, such a
pattern of GNP growth would require the growth rate
of money to be faster than 7.1 percent until late 1979
(see Table IV).
For purposes of analysis, two basic simulations are
conducted in order to determine the consistency of
the remaining variables. One is a steady growth of
money from mid-1977 to 1981 (summarized in Table
III), and the other is rapid growth of money in the
early years, with a tapering in the growth rate to
about 6 percent in 1981 (summarized in Table IV).
Money and Prices
The relationship between money and prices is a
well-established one.’° however, this relationship is
‘
0
See Denis S. Kamosky, “The Link Between Money and
Prices — 1971-76,” this Review (June 1976), pp. 17-23 and
Richard T. Selden, “Inflation: Are We Winning the Fight,”
The Morgan Guaranty Survey (October 1977), pp. 7-13.
to the gap between actual outptmt and an estimate of poten-
tial output.
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Table Ii
GOALS FOR 1981
From Mid Session Review
Rolem of Change from Provioci Year are in ParenthesesI
GNP Real GNP 3-Monlh
(Billions (Billions of Pricei Unemployment Treass.ry
of Dollars) 1972 DollarsI 1972 ‘= 00 - Rote —,, 8,11 Role
1976 Actual $1706.5 Si 274.? 133.88 7.7% s.o%
(11.61 (6.0) (531
1977 1899.3 1339.7 141 76 7.0 4.9
(11.3) (5.1) (5.9)
1978 2125.4 14107 150.69 63 5.0
(11.9) 5.3) (6.3)
1979 2365.5 1481.3 159.88 5.7 5.0
(11.3) (5.0) (6.1)
1980 26163 15583 168.03 5.2 5.0
(10.6) (5.2) (5.11
1981 2872.7 1634.6 175,26 4.8 50
(9.8) (4.9) (4.3)
1982 3119.7 17049 182.62 4.5 5.0
(86) (4.3) (4.2)
‘.1! GNI’ data tue mo~Ju, tel in rni,i. 1977 ‘st ismor.i of NI.’ ‘leer] ate.
not given explicit treatment by the Administration in pattern of money growth, the inflation rate would be
its discussion of long-range goals. For the period 1977 even greater than in the simulation using steady
to 1981, the Administration sees an average annual rate money growth, averaging 7.3 percent per year for
of increase in prices of 5.4 percent, with the increase 1977 to 1981 (see Table IV). The dynamics of the
more rapid from 1976 to 1978, but slowing to a 4.3 model suggest that the effect of the rapid growth in
percent rate by 1981. Examination of alternative simu- money from 1977 to 1979 on the inflation rate is still
lations of the St. Louis model indicates that a 5.4 per- very much present in 1981, with the rate exceeding
cent average rate of increase of prices from 1976 to 9 percent.
1981 is consistent with about a 5 percent trend growth
of money. This points out a discrepancy between
money growth implied by the GNP projection (7.1 Output and Unemployment
percent) and that implied by the price projection According to the St. Louts model, output over the
(5 percent).
longer run is determined by real factors in the
Consider now the inflation implications of the economy — growth of the labor force, work-leisure
growth in money that would yield the Administration’s preferences, capital growth, and technology. What
1981 GNP goal. Simulation with a steady 7.1 percent happens to money growth on average over the next
growth of money shows that prices will increase at a four years is of minor consequence for the growth of
7 percent average rate from 1977 to 1981 (see Table output in 1981. blowever, the internal dynamics of the
III). But more significantly, the dynamics of the St. Louis model suggest output would still be in the
model suggest that the rate of inflation would be ac- process of adjusting to its long-mn equilibrium rate
celerating in 1981, as opposed to the Administration’s five years after a current change in the growth rate of
contention that inflation would be decelerating. money. As a resnlt, the growth of output in 1981 does
differ somewhat for alternative growth rates of money.
Consider, on the other hand, the effects of an early
acceleration of money followed by a slowing, a pattern The Administration’s real CNP goal for 1981 is
apparently more consistent with the Administration’s $1,635 billion (1972 dollars). This is an average annual
tb-ne path of GNP to 1981. Based on this assumed rate of increase from 1977 of 51 percent. Simulation
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Table III
ST. LOUIS MODEL SIMULATION OF ADMINISTRATION’S 1981 GNP GOAL
Assuming Steady Growth of Money of 7.1 Percent
(Roles of charge from Previous Yuan ore In Porenlheses~
Short.
ONP Real GNP Teim Money
Bimans I II ions of Prices Unemployir en I In leresl (Billions
of 0o’lcr~) 19/2 Doliars~ (1972 = 00~ , Role Rate,’ of DoHars) 2
1976 Arlual LI ?c6.5 51274.7 133.9 7.7% 5.4% 5304.2
Il 1.~) ~ (5.3) (5.1)
1977 18969 3404 141.5 7.1 5.7 324.5
(11.2) (5,2) (5.7) (6.7)
1978 2120.2 14128 150.2 6.2 7.2 3488
11.8) (5.2) (6.]) (7.5)
1979 2342 I 1469.8 159.5 5.9 78 373.5
110.51 (40) (6.2) (7.1)
1980 2593.7 1519.3 171 0 5.8 8.3 400.1
(10.7) l3~) (/.21 ~7.I)
1981 2872.2 1552.1 185.4 6.2 88 428.5
110.71 (2.21 (8.4) (7.1)
1982 3180.6 1573.3 202.6 7.0 86 458.9
tic.?) (1.4) 19.31 (7.1(
‘Mi .mo:zmn
(lit’ St. I nulls noi]ils’I ~ itt1 mc ‘slt’flsl\ 7.1 me!’c’c’n,t tars’ short of the ~ilIlii1iisII’’diliIlS ws.it (see ‘table
gi’isulti ni nlimnc’\ inidiem~tes in .L~eI’mt~c arnuthoinnil— III”. With mdlei’nmdise ~lflIuit.Lhtnls (SI ~tt’tinlViOoi\~tiI
unt sf ‘.T perei’nt wl1ich lW $5.3 I,iIlinn ‘1972 sfiit. r.ttss is) nlssne~ is1 2 Ihl’nnngh 9 pcm’u’’’nit. it \‘‘as i:npns—
Table IV
ST. LOIJIS MODEL SIMuLATION OF ADMINISTRATION’S 1981 GNP GOAL
Assuming Declining Growth Rate of Money from 9.5 Percent Rate in IU/77
Roes o’ Chains f,on’ Prewmassn ‘5 .,~. an’ ., Pa’enlbt.ses)
Sha’ I
GNP Real ONP Tam m Money
lB mmani IBimlion, of Pnices Unsnl,oIo’,nvr’nil l.ilurrmcl (Bilmian,
of Dana s I 972 Damars) (1972 ‘~ 1001 Role Rafts of Dollars l
1976 AcLal $17065 512747 1339 77% 5.4% 5304.2
111 6) (6.0) (5.3) 15’)
1977 189/.8 1341 0 141.5 / 56 3249
(Ii?) (5 fl (5/) I68(
1978 2127.2 14171 502 6.1 73 350.0
(12.~) (5.7) (6.1) (77)
19/9 23638 I 4808 159.9 5? 8.i 377.2
1.1) (45) 6.5) 7.2)
1980 2617? 1524.4 1720 56 9.i 40M
1107) (2.9i I7.6) (68)
i98~ 287J5 15327 87.6 s.5 92 ‘27.0
(9.7) (05) (9.1)
1982 3!) 9.7 520/ 2055 8.2 7.8 448 6
(87) ) 08) (9.5~ (Si)
‘I’..,.. ..—,r...!. I’..’ i,: ‘‘‘‘‘‘al
L’agt’ 6FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
sible to simulate results yielding both the Admninis-
tration’s 1981 GNP and output goals. The alternative
simulation with early acceleration of money followed
by later slowing shows an average rate of output
growth of 3.4 percent (slower than for the steady
7.1 percent case) because inflation intensifies earlier
(see Table IV). Consequently, according to the St.
Louis model, achievement of the Administration’s
goals for nominal GNP will probably result in more
inflation and less output growth than the Administra-
tion desires.
Given that output growth falls substantially short of
the Administration’s goal in this model, the unemploy-
ment rate also falls short of the 4.75 percent target.
The 7.1 percent money growth simulation indicates
an unemployment rate of 6.2 percent in 1981 (Table
III). The alternative simulation (variable growth pat-
tern of money) indicates an even higher rate of un-
employment of 6.5 percent (Table IV). If the Admin-
istration should attempt to achieve its unemployment
goal (or. say, a more ambitious goal as suggested by
the Humphrey-Hawkins bill) with only aggregate
demand policies, more inflation will probably result.
Money, Prices, and Interest Rates
Although not so fundamental as a part of the Ad-
ministration’s goals, it is worth noting that the interest
rate pattern of the St. Louis model indicates another
area of inconsistency in the Administration’s set of
goals for 1981. The Administration indicates an as-
sumption of a steady 5.0 percent yield on 3-month
Treasury hills throughout the planning period. If
money growth is he]d at 7.1 percent to achieve the
1981 GNP target, the inflation implications are such
that short-term interest rates can be expected to
approach 9.0 percent by 1981. A similar result is
associated with the alternative simulation using a
variable growth pattern of money.
Implications for the Pederal Budget
The Federal budget projections are, of course, an
input to this process of long-run planning. The only
aspect that is checked here is the effect of the long-
range plan on real Federal outlays. According to the
mid-session review of the budget, 1981 outlays are
targeted •at 20.2 percent of GNP. The goal for CNP
implies a level of receipts such that a surplus of $50
billion is implied with current tax laws.11 Even if the
11
Receipts estimates assume enactment of the Administration’s
proposals as of july 1, 1977, and include energy proposals
and the effect of scheduled increases in the unemployment
NOVEMBER 1977
expenditure level were equal to 21 percent of GNP, a
$30 billion surplus would still he implied. The reasons
for such a surplus are twofold: One, the inflationary
experience has boosted the relative importance of the
individual income tax (a tax which is very responsive
to changes in nominal income) in the U.S. tax struc-
ture, and, two, receipts estimates include tax increases
for social security and those incorporated in the pro-
posed energy program.
Furthermore, if the GNP target is achieved and
expenditures reach their projected level, an implica-
tion of the St. Louis model is that real Federal outlays
would increase at a 0.4 percent average annual rate,
instead of the 1.0 percent rate that the Administration
projects. By comparison, real Federal outlays rose at a
4.5 percent average rate in the previous five-year
period from 1971 to 1976.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Administration has presented a set of national
economic goals for 1981, continuing a process of long-
range planning begun over two years ago. Exactly
how these assumptions are used in the policymaking
process is not clear, hut presumably departures from
plan suggest that the Administration believes that
policy actions should then he taken. Consequently, it
is important that such goals he suhjected to scrutiny.
Using as a starting point a growth of money that
would achieve the Administration’s GNP goal for
1981, it was found that based on past relationships,
the goals for prices, output, unemployment, and inter-
est rates pi’ohahlv are not achievable simultaneously,
Furthermore, the discrepancies are substantial. No
fundamental inconsistency was found relating to the
budget goals of restrained expenditure growth and at
least a balanced budget, htmt the implication is that
the implied growth of real Federal expenditures is
somewhat less than indicated in the long-range plan
and much below the growth in the recent past
Presentation by the Federal Government of its
long-range goals is laudable. The St. Louis model
does, however, indicate unequivocablv that the Ad-
ministrations goals are not achievable given the cur-
rent structure of the economy. Furthennore, an at-
tempt to use aggregate demand management to attain
the stated goals regarding output growth and unem-
ployment will impart substantial damage to the econ-
omy by causing inflation to accelerate. Eventually
such policies will cause an increase in unemployment.
instmrance tax base and the social security tax rate and base,
The effect of proposed tax reform is not included.
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